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Abstract
Convolutional neural networks have recently advanced
the state of the art in many tasks including edge and ob-
ject boundary detection. However, in this paper, we demon-
strate that these edge detectors inherit a troubling property
of neural networks: they can be fooled by adversarial exam-
ples. We show that adding small perturbations to an image
causes HED [42], a CNN-based edge detection model, to
fail to locate edges, to detect nonexistent edges, and even
to hallucinate arbitrary configurations of edges. More sur-
prisingly, we find that these adversarial examples transfer
to other CNN-based vision models. In particular, attacks
on edge detection result in significant drops in accuracy in
models trained to perform unrelated, high-level tasks like
image classification and semantic segmentation. Our code
will be made public.
1. Introduction
Edge and contour detection have long played a major
role in computer vision. First studied as a low-level function
of biological vision [21, 35], the notion that edge detection
can be used to filter out irrelevant lighting and texture in-
formation and extract shape information from images dates
back to early work in the field [18, 22, 6]. Edge detection
has been used as a pre-processing step in many classical vi-
sion algorithms [9, 44, 34, 4].
The history of edge detection is substantial, and a wide
variety of techniques have been developed. Early ap-
proaches used hand-crafted features [22, 6]. Later, data-
driven methods like [23, 9] emerged, in which some set
of model parameters is automatically tuned on a training
dataset in order to reduce false positives. Most recently,
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have been applied
to the edge detection problem [36, 42, 5, 28]. One ma-
jor success of this line of research is Holistically-Nested
Edge Detection (HED), a CNN model that achieves near-
“bighorn sheep” “Indian elephant”
Figure 1: Adding a small perturbation (right) to an image
causes a state-of-the-art edge detection model to produce a
contrived pattern. The same perturbation causes a VGG16
model to misclassify the image. We set ytarget to achieve the
edge pattern above. Here,  = 16.
human edge detection accuracy on standard datasets [42].
This approach has attracted attention for its competitive per-
formance, architectural simplicity, and computational effi-
ciency.
In recent years, automatic feature learning by CNNs has
replaced explicit edge detection for higher-level vision tasks
like image classification. However, it is well known that
CNNs learn edge-like features implicitly [24]. The Gabor-
like filters learned by the earliest layers of CNNs emerge
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regardless of which dataset or task they are trained on [43].
In this sense, edge detection is a universal visual task that
continues to underlie modern vision systems, albeit implic-
itly.
Despite CNNs’ marked gains in accuracy over classical
techniques in domains like classification and semantic seg-
mentation, they are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In
a variety of tasks [38, 40], small perturbations that look like
noise to a human can cause the network to produce non-
sensical results. In many cases, an attacker can select this
perturbation to cause the network to produce any desired
output. Worse, some attacks transfer: the same perturba-
tion trained to fool one network sometimes fools similar
networks trained on slightly different datasets.
However, it has not yet been shown whether these adver-
sarial examples are limited to networks trained on “com-
plex” visual tasks like classification and semantic segmen-
tation, or whether even a CNN trained to perform a low-
level task like edge detection is vulnerable. In this paper, we
address this question by investigating the degree to which
HED suffers from adversarial examples. Adapting exist-
ing methods to HED, we find that it is indeed vulnerable
to a particular class of adversarial attacks. Altogether, the
following results add yet another example to the list of do-
mains where deep neural networks can be fooled.
Just as edge detection is a universal component of many
methods in computer vision, we find that adversarial ex-
amples for edge detection affect other models, too: they
transfer to higher-level tasks. In particular, we show that an
attack on edges can transfer to models regardless of archi-
tecture, training data, and visual task. Without knowing the
parameters of a vision model, we can impair that model’s
accuracy on an image by attacking the edges of the image.
The intuition behind these results should be clear: because
edge detection is used in CNNs for downstream processing,
the CNN will fail to perform higher-level tasks if we can
obfuscate these edges.
2. Related work
Adversarial examples have primarily been studied in the
context of image classification [38, 14, 26]. However, they
have also been found to affect networks for object detec-
tion [40], semantic segmentation [40, 12], and natural lan-
guage processing [1]. Apart from finding new domains in
which adversarial examples exist, much of recent research
has focused on devising generic algorithms for generating
adversarial examples—i.e., how to synthesize them effi-
ciently and how to improve their success rates. The first
work of this kind uses a L-BFGS optimizer to minimize the
size of the perturbation subject to the constraint that the net-
work produces the target output [38]. The prevalent fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) [14] exploits the linearity of
the loss function landscape to generate adversarial exam-
ples with only first-order information and a single pass of
backpropagation. This method has been improved by iter-
ated updates [26] and momentum [10]. The literature on
defending against these adversarial examples is as rich as
the study of the attacks themselves; prominent examples
are defensive distillation [31], input transformations [15],
and adversarial training [38, 29].
The problem of attacking HED is dense, meaning that
the output space is high-dimensional. In contrast with Im-
ageNet models that have only a 1000-class softmax output,
HED produces outputs with tens or hundreds of thousands
of edge probabilities—one for each pixel. To address the
problem of attacking models with high-dimensional out-
puts, [40] propose dense adversary generation (DAG). Dur-
ing the optimization process, this method ignores pixels (or
object proposals) whose output already matches the target.
DAG was found to be effective in attacking semantic seg-
mentation and object detection models [40]. We find, how-
ever, that generic FGSM attacks suffice to fool HED, so we
do not adopt this method. In future work, one could inves-
tigate whether DAG leads to more effective attacks on edge
detection.
Harmonic Adversarial Attack Method [17] considers the
relationship between edge information and attack quality
and transferability. The goal of this work is to maximize the
smoothness of the perturbation so that the high-frequency
statistics of the image change as little as possible.
Black-box attacks and transferability have been the sub-
ject of extensive study since [38]. In the black-box setting,
the attacker does not have access to the model parameters
and architecture; however, the model can be queried to gen-
erate an attack. An attack transfers if it affects a different
model without access to parameters, architecture, or input-
output pairs. One approach to generating black-box adver-
sarial examples is to attack a surrogate model trained to
mimic outputs from the target model [30]. Another is to
train a separate network to generate perturbations [32, 3].
Finally, other work studies the transferability of attacks on
intermediate layers [19].
3. Methods
3.1. Holistically-Nested Edge Detection [42]
Like many recent models for semantic segmentation,
HED uses a fully-convolutional architecture [42]. This
means that all of the network’s parameters consist of con-
volution kernels; for this reason, the model is agnostic to
input size. HED’s convolutional layers are derived from
a pretrained VGG16 [37] model and are fine-tuned on the
Berkeley Segmentation Data Set (BSDS500) [2]. A multi-
scale architecture and deep supervision are two crucial as-
pects of the HED method. In particular, HED outputs edge
predictions from five different layers of the network, each
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corresponding to a different scale. During training, each of
these side outputs is encouraged to match the ground-truth
edge map [42].
In this paper, we show that despite HED’s impressive
performance on in-distribution images, this model is easily
fooled by adversarial examples. Just like neural network
training, the choice of loss function strongly affects the re-
sults of an adversarial attack. This is because adversarial
attacks are formulated as an optimization problem in the
space of images; like learning, generating adversarial exam-
ples also uses backpropagation to compute gradients of the
loss. Our attack methods optimize a similar cross-entropy
loss to that of HED, except for one crucial difference. Con-
sider the loss for side output m:
`m(X, ytrue; θ) = −1
2
∑
i : ytruei =1
log(yˆmi )
−1
2
∑
i : ytruei =0
log(1− yˆmi ).
(1)
Here, yˆmi denotes the ith pixel of side output m, which
is a function of X and θ. Unlike HED, we do not weigh
edges (ytruei = 1) more strongly than non-edges (y
true
i =
0). Instead, the positive and negative classes are penal-
ized equally. This enables additional types of attacks. In
particular, in the class-balanced formulation of HED, using
ytrue = 1 causes the first term to vanish, since it is propor-
tional to the number of non-edges in the ground truth ytrue.
This prevents the attack from generating new edges in the
image, making so-called edge activation attacks impossible.
Thus, we use a 1:1 class weighting for all attacks.
Like HED, the overall loss is a linear combination of in-
dividual side output losses and a multi-scale fusion term:
L(X, ytrue; θ) =
∑
m
αm`
m(X, ytrue; θ)
−1
2
∑
i : ytruei =1
log(yˆfusei )−
1
2
∑
i : ytruei =0
log(1− yˆfusei ),
(2)
where yˆfusei = sigmoid(
∑
m hmyˆ
m
i ). At test time, the final
edge prediction is a weighted average of the side outputs
and yˆfuse [42].
3.2. Generating adversarial examples
In this paper, we apply attacks in the family of fast gra-
dient sign methods (FGSM). These are some of the most
studied attack methods [14, 26, 25, 10], and they require
relatively little computation when compared with methods
like L-BFGS [14]. In the following section, we describe a
few relevant examples of fast gradient sign methods, adopt-
ing the notation of [41].
The original FGSM [14] generates an adversarial pertur-
bation using the gradient of the loss
Xadv = X +  sign(∇XL(X, ytrue; θ)), (3)
where ytrue is the ground-truth edge map. FGSM can
be extended to the iterative fast gradient sign method (I-
FGSM) [26] and the momentum iterative fast gradient sign
method (MI-FGSM) [10], the latter of which uses the up-
date rule
gn+1 = µgn +
∇XL(Xadvn , ytrue; θ)
‖∇XL(Xadvn , ytrue; θ)‖1
(4)
Xadvn+1 = Clip

X
[
Xadvn + α sign(gn+1)
]
, (5)
where  ≥ ∥∥X −Xadv∥∥∞ measures the size of the pertur-
bation and the momentum µ and step size α are attack pa-
rameters. In this paper, all attacks are based on MI-FGSM.
In transferability studies, [41] showed that introducing
input diversity transformations makes attack perturbations
more likely to transfer across architectures. Like data aug-
mentation, the input image X is randomly resized during
the optimization process. Following this approach, we test
M-DI2-FGSM, a modified version of MI-FGSM, in our
transfer experiments. This replaces the update in Eq. 4 with
gn+1 = µgn +
∇XL(T (Xadvn ), ytrue; θ)
‖∇XL(T (Xadvn ), ytrue; θ)‖1
(6)
where
T (X) =
{
resize(X) with probability 1/2
X otherwise
(7)
The transformation function resize(X) first down-scales
the image to a rectangle with random dimensions (w, h)—
where w, h ∼ Uniform(0, 300)—then randomly pads the
boundaries of the image with black pixels to restore it to its
original size.
After perturbing the image, it is possible that pixel inten-
sities of Xadv leave the valid range [0, 255]. To deal with
this, we simply clip pixel intensities to [0, 255] after adding
the perturbation. Although this can destroy some of the per-
turbation, [40] find that the effect is negligible for small ,
so we adopt this practice.
3.3. Targeted attacks
Up to this point, we have only discussed so-called un-
targeted attacks, which maximize the original training loss.
Adversarial attacks also come in a targeted form that mini-
mizes, rather than maximizes, a modified loss. For example,
targeted MI-FGSM has the update rule
gn+1 = µgn +
∇XL(Xadvn , ytarget; θ)
‖∇XL(Xadvn , ytarget; θ)‖1
(8)
Xadvn+1 = Clip

X
[
Xadvn − α sign(gn+1)
]
, (9)
3
(a) no attack (b) MI-FGSM (c) I-MI-FGSM
ytarget = 1− ytrue
(d) S-MI-FGSM
ytarget = 0
(e) A-MI-FGSM
ytarget = 1
Figure 2: Figure 2a is an unaltered image from the BSDS500 test set and the output of HED. Attack 2b uses the untargeted
MI-FGSM optimizer (Eqs. 4 and 5). Inverse-target (Figure 2c), suppression (Figure 2d), and activation attacks (Figure 2e)
use the targeted MI-FGSM optimizer (Eqs. 8 and 9). Here, we use  = 16 and 10 iterations.
where ytarget is the desired output of the network. Note that
ytrue has been changed to ytarget and the sign in front of α is
now negative. This leads to four main attack variants, the
last three of which are targeted:
U Untargeted attack. Use Eqs. 4 and 5.
S Suppression attack. The objective is to lower the
probability of edges throughout the image. This cor-
responds to setting ytarget = 0.
A Activation attack. The objective is to increase the
probability of edges throughout the image. This cor-
responds to setting ytarget = 1.
I Inverse-target attack. The objective is to minimize
the loss on the inverted ground truth label, using
ytarget = 1 − ytrue. This is an alternative to untargeted
attacks.
3.4. Evaluation
We evaluate our approach on the test set of the BSDS500
dataset [2]. This consists of 200 images with ground-truth
boundary annotations. Like [42], evaluation is performed
using the fixed-contour threshold F-score (ODS). We per-
form the same standard non-maximal-suppression proce-
dure as [6, 42] before evaluating outputs. To measure the
effectiveness of the attack, we compare the mean ODS of
HED outputs on unattacked images and outputs on attacked
images.
To compensate for not using a class-balanced loss
(Eq. 1), we apply a morphological thickening operation (ra-
dius of 3 pixels) to the ground-truth labels ytrue for untar-
geted attacks.
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U MI-FGSM Eqs. 4, 5 n/a
S S-MI-FGSM X Eqs. 8, 9 0
A A-MI-FGSM X Eqs. 8, 9 1
I I-MI-FGSM X Eqs. 8, 9 1− ytrue
U M-DI2-FGSM Eqs. 6, 9 n/a X
S S-M-DI2-FGSM X Eqs. 6, 9 0 X
A A-M-DI2-FGSM X Eqs. 6, 9 1 X
I I-M-DI2-FGSM X Eqs. 6, 9 1− ytrue X
Table 1: Attack variants. No prefix (U): untargeted attacks.
S- prefix (S): suppression attacks. A- prefix (A): activa-
tion attacks. I- prefix (I): inverse-target attacks. The last
four attacks are the same as the first four, except they use
input diversity transformations (Eqs. 6, 7).
4. Edge attack experiments
In the following experiments, we evaluate these attack
variants on BSDS500. All attacks are run for 10 iterations
with  = 16. We fix µ = 0.5 and α = 2. In Table 2,
we see that all methods decrease the ODS F-score of HED,
with I-MI-FGSM being the most effective attack. For other
methods, we find that the combination of side-output aver-
aging and non-maximal suppression protects HED against
major drops in accuracy, even though the raw output of the
network changes (see Figure 2).
It is worth noting that these attacks are less successful at
suppressing edges than activating non-edges. In Figure 2d,
4
 MI-FGSM I-MI-FGSM S-MI-FGSM A-MI-FGSM
0 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775
1 0.720 0.728 0.752 0.756
2 0.680 0.637 0.731 0.726
4 0.636 0.445 0.702 0.684
8 0.588 0.332 0.645 0.642
16 0.545 0.312 0.573 0.580
Table 2: BSDS500 test ODS F-score as a function of attack
magnitude  for each attack variant.
`2 SSIM ESSIM Laplacian
Unattacked 0.000 1.000 1.000 37.234
MI-FGSM 0.090 0.760 0.342 45.441
I-MI-FGSM 0.107 0.684 0.281 47.875
S-MI-FGSM 0.096 0.754 0.318 50.589
A-MI-FGSM 0.106 0.675 0.297 48.708
Table 3: Measurements of image degradation due to vari-
ous attacks. Each metric is computed on every image in the
BSDS500 test set; mean values are reported. `2 corresponds
to the normalized `2-norm, i.e.
∥∥X −Xadv∥∥
2
/ ‖X‖2.
SSIM [39] is a prevalent measurement of image degrada-
tion. ESSIM [17], or Edge-SSIM, is obtained by applying
SSIM to the Laplacian maps of each image. Laplacian cor-
responds the mean absolute value of the Laplace operator
evaluated on the attacked image.
notice that the boundary of the buffalo is still detected, al-
beit with much lower probability. This may be due to the
weighting of the loss function in Eq. 1, as edges are less
frequent than non-edges so they contribute less to the loss
function. In general, we find that the attacks typically fail
to suppress unambiguous edges (e.g., the high-contrast leg
in Figure 2) and fool those that require more global context
to detect (e.g., the boundary between the mountain and the
sky in Figure 2).
We also investigate the effect of attacking HED’s indi-
vidual side outputs. Instead of optimizing the loss in Eq. 2,
we simply optimize the single-side-output loss in Eq. 1 for
m = 1, . . . , 5. As shown in Figure 3, attacking side out-
puts 2-5 is more effective than attacking side output 1. Two
possible explanations for this are (1) when attacking deeper
layers, more of the network’s parameters are available for
the attack to exploit, and (2) later side outputs have larger
receptive fields, so each edge output value is a function of
more degrees of freedom in the input. These findings agree
with the previous paragraph and show that the deeper, non-
local layers of HED are the most vulnerable to attack.
Some of the perturbations generated by our method can
be perceived by the eye; we quantify this perceptibility us-
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Figure 3: Precision-recall curves from I-MI-FGSM attacks
on different side outputs. The “inverted” precision-recall
curves are due to the fact that I-MI-FGSM makes the net-
work more likely to classify edges as non-edges and non-
edges as edges.
ing image quality metrics. In Table 3, we see that it is possi-
ble to differentiate attacked images from unattacked images
using metrics for image quality degradation. This makes
sense in the context of earlier findings that FGSM results
in loss of SSIM and Edge-SSIM scores [17]. Note that the
mean absolute value of the Laplacian is higher for attacked
images, but this effect is small. Altogether, these visual and
statistical discrepancies suggest that it may be possible to
detect if the edges of an image have been attacked. We leave
this as an open research question.
5. Transferability
The following section is concerned with how attacks on
HED transfer to higher-level vision tasks. These results are
more surprising than those of Section 4, since they show
that edge-based attacks have implications beyond edge de-
tection. We consider two important tasks: image classifica-
tion (a high-level task) and semantic segmentation (a low-
and high-level task). It is worth investigating both since
edges are a low-level feature, and altering edges might have
different effects on networks trained to perform high-level
tasks compared to those trained to perform low-level tasks.
(Edge detection and semantic segmentation differ in that
edges may not correspond to object boundaries; the related
task of object boundary detection [33] corresponds more
closely to semantic segmentation.)
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5.1. Classification
First, we study the effect of edge-based attacks on Im-
ageNet classification [8]. For each model, we report the
top-1 classification accuracy on the validation set before at-
tack and after attack. All classifiers use a standard imple-
mentation and publicly-available pretrained weights. We
test VGG16 [37], the architecture that HED is based on.
To investigate cross-architecture transfer, we also consider
models from the ResNet family [16]. We use the same mo-
mentum and step size parameters from the previous experi-
ments. When not stated, we set  = 16, which yields a slight
perturbation. Because we do not have ground-truth edge
annotations for the ImageNet dataset, we use the output of
HED for ytrue. This is necessary for untargeted attacks like
MI-FGSM (Eqs. 4 and 5).
As shown in Table 4, edge-based attacks do transfer to
ImageNet classifiers. The most significant decline is in
VGG16, whose accuracy drops from 71.264% to 14.332%
on images attacked with A-M-DI2-FGSM. This is not much
of a surprise: VGG16 and HED share the same architecture,
and HED is pretrained with VGG16 weights, so one might
expect attacks on HED to transfer to VGG16. More un-
expectedly, however, the same perturbations also cause the
accuracy of ResNet models to drop precipitously. The effect
is greater the shallower the model—ResNet18 suffers a 40-
point drop from A-M-DI2-FGSM whereas ResNet152 only
has a 34-point drop—but in all cases the reduction is con-
sequential. This drop does not occur when the pixels of the
perturbation are randomly permuted (column 3 of Table 6),
showing that the structure of the perturbation matters.
Again in Table 4, observe that the edge activation attack
A-M-DI2-FGSM and the inverse-target attack I-M-DI2-
FGSM transfer the best to classification networks (columns
5, 9). In part, this is due to the small boost in transferability
that comes from input diversity transformations. Nonethe-
less, the effect is small, and the same techniques without
input diversity transformations transfer almost as well (e.g.,
compare columns 8 and 9). Overall, it appears that edge
activation attacks transfer to classification much better than
other types of edge-based attacks.
To give a better understanding of transferability of at-
tacks on edge detection, Table 6 compares the drop in clas-
sification accuracy due to edge-based attacks versus white-
box attacks on the same models. In particular, we at-
tack VGG16 and ResNet34 directly, using the same at-
tack method (MI-FGSM) and identical parameters ( = 16,
µ = 0.5, α = 2, 10 iterations). However, instead of using
gradients from HED, we use gradients of the cross-entropy
loss from the ImageNet ground truth like standard white-
box classification attacks [14]. The white-box MI-FGSM
attacks on VGG16 and ResNet34 are highly effective on
their respective models (both lead to less than 3% accuracy).
However, unlike edge attacks, the perturbations from these
attacks do not transfer to the other models.
We conduct an additional experiment to see if white-box
adversarial examples for classification transfer to edge de-
tection. Using a ResNet18 model, we generate adversarial
examples for each image in the BSDS500 test set using MI-
FGSM. Here, we set ytrue to the output of ResNet18 on the
BSDS500 images. We find no difference in HED F-scores
on the perturbed images versus unperturbed images, indi-
cating that the transferability only works in one direction.
Table 5 shows the transferability of attacks on differ-
ent HED side outputs. Here, we choose A-M-DI2-FGSM,
which we found has the highest transferability (Table 4).
We observe that attacking side output 3 transfers the best
to classification (i.e., optimizing the loss in Eq. 1 for m =
3). This result mimics findings that attacking intermedi-
ate layers of classifiers—rather than output layers—leads to
greater transferability of adversarial examples [19]. How-
ever, attacking the multi-scale loss of Eq. 2 still transfers
better than attacking any individual side output.
5.2. Texture bias and transferability
To address the question of why edge-based attacks trans-
fer to ImageNet classification, we evaluate these attacks on
models that have been explicitly trained to ignore texture. It
has been shown that ImageNet training induces texture bias
in CNNs [13]. The Stylized-ImageNet dataset [13] consists
of ImageNet training examples that have transformed us-
ing AdaIN style transfer [20]. This style transfer removes
low-level texture information but preserves global shape.
The authors of this dataset show that merely training on
Stylized-ImageNet rather than ImageNet reduces a CNN’s
reliance on texture to classify images [13]. In this experi-
ment, we investigate whether this reduced reliance on tex-
ture improves robustness to edge-based attacks.
To answer this question, we compare the ImageNet vali-
dation accuracy of a ResNet50 model trained on ImageNet
and a ResNet50 model trained jointly on ImageNet and
Stylized-ImageNet under various edge-based attacks. Ac-
cording to the first row of Table 7, both models have roughly
the same performance on unattacked images (75.586% ver-
sus 74.074%). However, on edge-based adversarial exam-
ples, the two models’ accuracy differs considerably.
In Table 7, note that training on stylized images improves
robustness to edge suppression and activation attacks, but
it decreases robustness to untargeted MI-FGSM edge at-
tacks. In particular, the Stylized-ImageNet model achieves
a 6-point lower accuracy on MI-FGSM adversarial exam-
ples than the ImageNet-trained model. Since this model is
biased towards shape, this suggests that MI-FGSM targets
shape information more than S-MI-FGSM or A-M-DI2-
FGSM. On the other hand, on adversarial examples gen-
erated with S-MI-FGSM, the shape-biased model achieves
a 6-point higher accuracy, and on those generated with A-
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none
MI-
FGSM
M-DI2-
FGSM
I-MI-
FGSM
I-M-DI2-
FGSM
S-MI-
FGSM
S-M-DI2-
FGSM
A-MI-
FGSM
A-M-DI2-
FGSM
VGG16 71.264 25.184 25.698 15.330 14.830 26.554 26.042 15.856 14.332
ResNet18 68.932 36.748 36.944 29.380 28.902 36.480 35.140 30.310 28.662
ResNet34 72.766 43.910 44.696 35.630 34.202 43.448 42.720 36.374 34.544
ResNet50 75.586 46.202 46.818 36.772 35.574 45.518 45.554 37.152 35.002
ResNet101 77.122 50.354 51.128 41.132 40.094 49.704 49.206 42.346 40.644
ResNet152 78.018 53.418 54.030 45.106 43.722 53.146 52.816 45.870 43.734
Table 4: The top-1 ImageNet accuracy of classification models under various edge-based attacks.
Side output: VGG16 ResNet18 ResNet34 ResNet50 ResNet101 ResNet152
1 39.042 46.376 51.456 52.33 55.262 58.832
2 25.67 40.244 48.122 47.146 51.97 54.83
3 17.352 32.87 40.584 38.896 42.946 46.758
4 20.884 34.642 40.38 40.94 46.288 49.984
5 22.896 36.424 41.19 44.03 48.146 51.996
All 14.332 28.662 34.544 35.002 40.644 43.734
Table 5: Classification transferability results when A-M-DI2-FGSM is applied to one of the side outputs of HED. Of all of
the individual side outputs, the third one is the best to attack (with the exception of ResNet34). However, attacking all side
outputs simultaneously (by optimizing Eq. 2 directly) still transfers the best.
unattacked A-MI-FGSM
A-MI-FGSM
(permuted)
VGG16
MI-FGSM
ResNet34
MI-FGSM
VGG16 71.264 15.856 65.112 2.274 65.774
ResNet18 68.932 30.31 64.262 63.97 59.784
ResNet34 72.766 36.374 68.982 68.546 0.536
ResNet50 75.586 37.152 71.424 71.378 67.87
ResNet101 77.122 42.346 73.718 73.7 70.34
ResNet152 78.018 45.87 74.878 74.946 72.046
Table 6: A comparison of top-1 ImageNet classification accuracies on images attacked with A-MI-FGSM and white-box
MI-FGSM. The third column is obtained by directly attacking VGG16 using MI-FGSM, then evaluating all six models on
the perturbed images. As shown, white-box attacks on VGG16 and ResNet34 are more effective than edge-based A-MI-
FGSM, but they do not transfer as well to the other models, unlike edge-based attacks. The third column, which highlights
the importance of the structure of the perturbation, is obtained by permuting the pixels returned by A-MI-FGSM, in a similar
manner to [40].
M-DI2-FGSM, it improves by 13 points. This suggests that
the edge suppression and edge activation attacks obfuscate
texture more than untargeted edge attacks.
5.3. Semantic segmentation
In addition to classification, we also study whether ad-
versarial examples for edge detection transfer to seman-
tic segmentation. Like those for classification, adversar-
ial examples for semantic segmentation have also been
shown to transfer between deep network architectures [40].
DeepLabv3+ [7] is a state-of-the-art CNN model for seman-
tic segmentation. We test a model provided by the authors
of the paper [7] that is pretrained on MS-COCO [27] and
on augmented training examples from PASCAL VOC 2012
[11]. To evaluate the transferability of edge-based attacks,
we compare the mean intersection over union (mIOU) of
DeepLabv3+ on unperturbed and perturbed images from the
PASCAL VOC 2012 validation set.
As shown in Table 8, attacks on edge detection also
transfer to DeepLabv3+, albeit to a lesser degree. The
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ImageNet
(texture-biased)
ImageNet
+ Stylized-ImageNet
(shape-biased)
unattacked 75.586 74.074
MI-FGSM 46.202 40.952
S-MI-FGSM 45.518 51.778
A-M-DI2-FGSM 35.002 48.786
Table 7: Top-1 ImageNet validation accuracies of a
ResNet50 model trained on ImageNet and both the Ima-
geNet and the Stylized-ImageNet datasets. Decreasing tex-
ture bias by training on Stylized-ImageNet improves ro-
bustness to suppression and activation attacks like S-MI-
FGSM and A-M-DI2-FGSM, but it reduces robustness to
MI-FGSM.
attack mIOU
none 0.822
MI-FGSM 0.648
S-MI-FGSM 0.681
A-MI-FGSM 0.553
S-M-DI2-FGSM 0.735
A-M-DI2-FGSM 0.603
A-MI-FGSM (permuted) 0.775
Table 8: Performance of DeepLabv3+ model on the
validation set of PASCAL VOC 2012. The model,
xception65 coco voc train aug, was trained on
the COCO and VOC 2012 training datasets (with data aug-
mentation).
degradation in this model is smaller than in classification;
in Figure 4—a typical example of semantic segmentation—
many objects in the scene are still detected. However, like in
classification experiments, when we randomly permute the
perturbation like [40], we observe a much smaller degrada-
tion in performance (0.047 drop with permutation and 0.269
without). This demonstrates that the structure of perturba-
tion still matters; the attack cannot be replicated with ran-
dom noise.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have added to the wealth of existing
evidence that, regardless of task or domain application, un-
defended deep neural networks are susceptible to adversar-
ial attacks. In particular, we have shown that even a net-
work trained to perform a low-level, “straightforward” task
like edge detection can be confused and manipulated by
slight perturbations. This lends further credence to the no-
tion that adversarial examples are intrinsic to current neural
sofa chair table tv
Figure 4: Top row: output of DeepLabv3+ model [7] on an
image from the Pascal VOC 2012 validation set. Bottom
row: output on the same image attacked with A-MI-FGSM.
Under an edge-based attack, the segmentation model fails
to recognize the sofa.
networks (or their optimization process) rather than a mere
artifact of training data and task. Surprisingly, the same at-
tacks that fool an edge detection network also fool deep net-
works trained to perform classification and, to a lesser ex-
tent, semantic segmentation. These attacks transfer despite
significant differences in network architecture and training
data.
Still, unresolved questions remain. The exact reasons
why edge-based adversarial attacks transfer to classification
and segmentation are unclear. Perhaps the low-level cues
learned by HED are shared by ImageNet classifiers and se-
mantic segmentation networks, and when these cues are dis-
rupted, all models suffer. Perhaps ImageNet classifiers’ re-
liance on texture information makes them especially prone
to certain types of attacks (edge suppression and activation),
a question we began to address in Section 5.2.
In this work, we have not explored in depth how to de-
fend against adversarial attacks for edge detection. As a
future direction for research, we see potential in protect-
ing HED and similar models against white-box adversarial
examples and defending higher-level vision models against
edge-based transfer attacks. It is possible that existing de-
fense techniques (e.g., adversarial training [14, 29]) are ef-
fective here; otherwise, new defenses may need to be ex-
plored.
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